

Message Text

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P R 141710Z MAY 75

FM USMISSION USBERLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0902

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN UNN

AMEMBASSY LONDON 7166

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USBERLIN 924

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PFOR, WB, GW, UR

SUBJECT: HILLENBRAND-ABRASIMOV LUNCHEON, MAY 12

1. SUMMARY: AT LUNCHEON HOSTED BY AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND MAY 12, SOVIET AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV DISPLAYED NONE OF UNPLEASANTNESS AND AGGRESSIVITY THAT REPORTEDLY CHARACTERIZED HIS MEETING WITH FRENCH AMBASSADOR WORMSER APRIL 4. HE MADE QUIET PITCH FOR FOUR-POWER CONSULTATIONS ON BERLIN, AND REPEATED, WITHOUT MUCH ELABORATION, STANDARD SOVIET LINE THAT FRG WAS VIOLATING QA WITH CONNIVANCE OF WESTERN ALLIES. HE UNDERScoreD IMPORTANCE OF OBSERVING THE QA CAREFULLY AND AVOIDING "LIBERAL"INTERPRETATIONS. ONLY SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS CONCERNED PROBLEMS RELATING TO SOVIET FACILITIES IN WEST BERLIN, AND "INTRUSIONS"INTO GDR AIRSPACE. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND DISCOURAGED IDEA OF A FOUR-POWER MEETING, AND SOUGHT TO DISPEL WHAT SEEMED TO BE A SOVIET HYPOTHESIS THAT RECENT

ACTIONS OF FRG AND WESTERN ALLIES VIS-A-VIS BERLIN WERE

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PART OF CALCULATED EFFORT TO CREATE DE FACTO SITUATION THAT

WOULD ALTER THE NATURE OF THE COMPROMISE REACHED IN THE QA. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND CALLED ATTENTION TO DANGER INHERENT IN AIR CORRIDOR INCIDENTS OF MAY 5 AND 7, AND REQUESTED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES WITH GDR TO TREAT INCIDENTS SUCH AS DROWNING OF TURKISH CHILD IN SPREE MAY 11 ON HUMANITARIAN BASIS BY FACILITATING RESCUE EFFORTS. END SUMMARY.

2. FOLLOWING ACCOUNT CLEARED BY AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND. BEFORE LUNCH AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV DREW AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND ASIDE TO SAY THAT, ON A PURELY PERSONAL BASIS, HE WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE A FOUR-POWER MEETING OF AMBASSADORS ON THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE COMING INTO EFFECT OF THE QA. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND WAS NON-COMMITTAL, MERELY NOTING THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE OPEN TO MISINTERPRETATION BY THE PUBLIC AND THAT IT SEEMED BETTER TO LEAVE THE FOUR-POWER MECHANISM IN RESERVE FOR THE ACTUAL KIND OF SITUATION FOR WHICH IT WAS CONTEMPLATED IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF.

3. OPENING THE AFTER-LUNCHEON CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND SAID THAT HE HARDLY NEEDED TO REMIND THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, AS ONE OF THE NEGOTIATORS, HOW IMPORTANT WE REGARDED THE QA AS A DOCUMENT REGULARIZING AND PROVIDING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SITUATION IN BERLIN. FOR OUR PART WE BELIEVED THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD GENERALLY WORKED WELL, AND IT WAS OUR HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND GDR SHARED THIS VIEW. ONE HAD ONLY TO THINK BACK TO THE 1950'S AND EARLY 1960'S, WHEN DISPUTES OVER BERLIN NECESSITATED EVEN FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCES, TO RECOGNIZE THE GREAT IMPROVEMENT THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE.

4. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND SAID THAT, AS AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV WAS WELL AWARE, THE QA REPRESENTED A COMPROMISE FOR BOTH SIDES, AND THE LANGUAGE IN WHICH THIS COMPROMISE WAS EMBODIED WAS LARGELY GENERAL AND IN MANY AREAS DID NOT ATTEMPT SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS. FROM THE VOLUME OF PROTESTS THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED, THE ALLIES RECOGNIZED FULLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD PROBLEMS WITH SPECIFIC
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QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE QA, BUT WE HAD ALWAYS FELT THAT THE VARIOUS MATTERS WHICH THE SOVIETS CONSIDERED OBJECTIONABLE WERE CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND REMARKED THAT, HAVING OBSERVED FOR SOME TIME THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ALLIES AND SOVIETS OVER BERLIN, HE HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION--REINFORCED BY HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR FALIN IN BONN--THAT MUCH OF THE PRESENT DIFFICULTY STEMMED PERHAPS LESS FROM THE

INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS OF THE FRG AND THE WESTERN ALLIES
THAN FROM WHAT APPEARED TO BE A SUSPICION ON THE PART OF
THE SOVIETS THAT THESE ACTIONS WERE PART OF A CONSPIRACY
TO CREATE A DE FACTO SITUATION THAT WOULD ALTER THE NATURE
OF THE COMPROMISE REACHED IN THE QA. IN OTHER WORDS,
THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO BE ACTING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT
THERE WAS A CALCULATED PATTERN OF ACTION ON THE WESTERN
SIDE DESIGNED TO SECURE ADVANTAGES THAT REPRESENTED A
QUALITATIVE AND NOT SIMPLY A QUANTITATIVE CHANGE IN THE
STATUS QUO. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND SAID THAT HE WISHED TO
DISPEL ANY SUCH NOTION: THIS WAS CERTAINLY NOT THE ALLIED
APPROACH TO THE SITUATION, AND IT WAS NOT THAT OF THE FRG
EITHER. WE WERE SUFFICIENTLY AWARE
OF THE BENEFITS OF THE QA THAT IT WOULD BE FOOLHARDY FOR
US TO PERMIT ANY CALCULATED EFFORT TO UNDERMINE THE
AGREEMENT OR TO UPSET ITS DELICATE BALANCE. AMBASSADOR
HILLENBRAND REMINDED AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV OF THE RELEVANT DISCUSSION
BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO
LAST YEAR. THE POSITION STATED BY THE SECRETARY THEN REPRESENTED THE
SITUATION TODAY.

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FM USMISSION USBERLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0903

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN UNN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 USBERLIN 924

LIMDIS

5. AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV PREFACED HIS REMARKS ON BERLIN

WITH EXTENDED REMARKS ON THE CURRENT STATE OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS, STRESSING THE NEED TO PURSUE EAST-WEST DETENTE FURTHER. HE SPOKE OF THE BENEFICIAL RESULTS OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ALREADY CONCLUDED, AND OF THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITS, THE FORTHCOMING JOINT SPACE VENTURE, AND THE RECIPROCAL VISITS OF NAVAL VESSELS TO BOSTON AND LENINGRAD. HE UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION OF A SUCCESSFUL CSCE CONCLUSION, AND OF SALT II. CITING A RECENT MESSAGE FROM BREZHNEV TO PRESIDENT FORD, AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV SAID THAT IF THE US AND SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN ABLE TO FIND A COMMON BASIS FOR ACTION IN WORLD WAR II, THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND COMMON LANGUAGE FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE--WITH BENEFIT NOT ONLY TO THEMSELVES BUT TO THE ENTIRE WORLD. ABRASIMOV WAS LESS UPBEAT AS FAR AS COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WERE CONCERNED, NOTING THAT SINCE CONGRESS HAD NEGATED THE EFFECT OF THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT ON THE SUBJECT, THE SOVIETS NOW CONSIDERED THIS AGREEMENT NO LONGER VALID. THE US, ABRASIMOV MAINTAINED, SUFFERED MORE THAN DID THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE ABSENCE OF A TRADE AGREEMENT--AND ALL THIS
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SIMPLY BECAUSE CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE US WERE TRYING TO INTERFERE IN SOVIET DOMESTIC AFFAIRS.

6. TURNING TO BERLIN MATTERS, AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV CHARACTERIZED THE QA--IN WHICH, HE COMMENTED, THE US AND THE USSR WERE THE MAIN PARTIES--AS A LONG -LASTING AGREEMENT THAT WOULD HAVE TO REGULATE THE BERLIN SITUATION FOR MANY YEARS. FOR THIS REASON, HE STRESSED, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT IT BE CAREFULLY OBSERVED AND THAT NEITHER SIDE SEEK TO ADVANCE "LIBERAL" AD HOC INTERPRETATIONS OF ITS PROVISIONS. IN REFERENCE TO AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND'S EARLIER REMARKS ABRASIMOV SAID THAT "SPEAKING FRANKLY" IT WAS ONE-SIDED FOR THE THREE ALLIES TO DECIDE WHAT WAS ACCEPTABLE IN BERLIN NOW AND IN THE FUTURE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD SIGNED AN AGREEMENT AMONG FOUR PARTIES, AND ONE-SIDED WESTERN DECISIONS WERE IN THEMSELVES A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT. ABRASIMOV SAID THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO RECITE PAST HISTORY, BUT HE WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE FRG HAD BEEN GUILTY OF VIOLATING THE QA WITH THE CONSENT OF AND IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE WESTERN ALLIES. THE SOVIETS WERE NOT SUSPICIOUS OF A CONSPIRACY--THEY WERE PROTESTING AGAINST THE THREE POWERS SILENTLY HELPING THE FRG TO ACHIEVE WHAT IT WANTED. AMBASSADPR ABRASIMOV SAID THAT HE WISHED TO CALL ON THE ALLIES TO REACT NEGATIVELY TO ANY FURTHER EFFORTS ON THE PART OF CERTAIN GROUPS IN THE FRG TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION IN BERLIN. THIS WAS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE.

7. ABRASIMOV THEN RAISED THREE PRACTICAL QUESTIONS
ARISING FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QA'S PROVISIONS ON
SOVIET FACILITIES. HE SAID THAT THE TRADE OFFICE HAD
BEEN ATTEMPTING FOR TWO YEARS TO PURCHASE RESIDENTIAL
SPACE IN THE CITY, BUT HAD BEEN REFUSED THE NECESSARY
PERMISSION. THIS, HE STRESSED, AMOUNTED TO A VIOLATION
OF THE QA. HE COMPLAINED ABOUT THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT
IT TOOK TO SECURE ALLIED APPROVAL FOR PERSONS NOMINATED
TO THE STAFFS OF SOVIET OFFICES IN WEST BERLIN. COULD
NOT THIS BUREAUCRATIC FOOT-DRAFFING BE ELIMINATED? HE
SAID NO RESPONSE HAD BEEN RECEIVED TO INQUIRIES ABOUT SOVIET
WAREHOUSES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF JOINT VENTURES WITH
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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LIMDIS

11. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE

TO RAISE TWO PROBLEMS TO WHICH HE DID NOT EXPECT AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE BUT WHICH HE WOULD ASK AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV TO TAKE UNDER ADVISEMENT TO SEE IF SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES COULD NOT BE AVOIDED IN THE FUTURE. THE FIRST OF THESE CONCERNED SEVERAL SERIOUS INCIDENTS INVOLVING FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN THE AIR CORRIDORS TO BERLIN, THE MOST RECENT OCCURRING ON MAY 5 AND 7. RECOUNTING THE FACTS OF THE INCIDENTS (REPORTED USBERLIN 877), AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND SAID THAT WE WERE CONVICTED THAT THE FIRST WAS NOT A DELIBERATE VIOLATION OF THE CORRIDOR FLIGHT RULES, BUT WAS ALL THE MORE DANGEROUS SINCE IT INVOLVED PROBABLE PILOT ERROR AND/OR A BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATIONS ON THE SOVIET SIDE. THE SECOND INCIDENT HAD CLEARLY BEEN A DELIBERATE MANEUVER. BOTH INCIDENTS HAD BEEN RAISED IN BASC, BUT BECAUSE OF THEIR GRAVITY WE WISHED TO MENTION THEM AT A HIGHER LEVEL IN THE HOPE THAT AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV WOULD LOOK INTO THEM.

12. THE SECOND MATTER CONCERNED THE DROWNING OF A TURKISH

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CHILD IN THE SPREE RIVER ON MAY 11. THE WEST BERLIN FIRE DEPARTMENT HAD SOUGHT TO RESCUE THE CHILD, AND MIGHT POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SAVE ITS LIFE, BUT THE EAST BERLIN POLICE HAD REFUSED PERMISSION TO ENTER THE RIVER (AT THAT PARTICULAR POINT WHOLLY WITHIN EAST BERLIN). AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND SAID THAT HE WISHED TO ASK AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE GDR THAT LEGALISTIC AND BUREAUCRATIC WAYS WERE INAPPROPRIATE IN INSTANCES SUCH AS THIS WHERE THE LIFE OF A CHILD OR OTHER HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS WERE AT STAKE. SOME FLEXIBILITY WAS REQUIRED IN SUCH CASES. HOPEFULLY, HE ADDED, AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV WOULD NOT TAKE THE POSITION THAT THIS WAS SOLELY A MATTER BETWEEN THE WEST BERLIN AND EAST BERLIN POLICE.

13. IN REGARD TO AIR INCIDENTS, ABRASIMOV RECALLED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD THE RIGHT TO FLY IN AND ACROSS THE CORRIDORS, BUT THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT USE OF THE CORRIDORS SHOULD BE REASONABLE AND TO THIS END BASC HAD BEEN SET UP. HE SAID THAT IF THE SOVIET EMBASSY WAS PROVIDED WITH FULL DETAILS OF THE INCIDENTS IN QUESTION, AN INVESTIGATION WOULD BE CONDUCTED AND THE RESULTS WOULD BE PASSED TO THE US SIDE IN DUE COURSE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IF THE MAY 5 INCIDENT WAS AS DESCRIBED, THE SOVIET PLANE AS WELL HAD BARELY AVERTED DISASTER. REGARDING THE SPREE DROWNING, AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV, HAVING SAID THAT THIS WAS A MATTER WITHIN THE GDR'S COMPETENCE, AGREED TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM WITH THE "PROPER" AUTHORITIES AND TO GET BACK IN TOUCH THROUGH THE POLAD CHANNEL.

14. MISSION COMMENT: WE WILL BE PASSING TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY THE REQUESTED DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE MAY 5 AND 7 CORRIDOR INCIDENTS. WE WILL EXAMINE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSIONS ABRASIMOV'S COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE SOVIET FACILITIES WITH A VIEW TO BEING FORTHCOMING IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. OF THE THREE MATTERS RAISED, PURCHASE OF PROPERTY IS LIKELY TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT. THE OFFICE OF TRADE ASSOCIATIONS WOULD LIKE TO BUY AN APARTMENT HOUSE FOR ITS PERSONNEL--ALTHOUGH THE REQUEST TO DO SO WAS TABLED IN JANUARY 1975, NOT TWO

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YEARS AGO--BUT THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSIONS ARE OPPOSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO GO BEYOND AGREED MINUTE II OF THE QA AND THE SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN PERMITTING THE ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY, WHICH CONTINUES TO BE GOVERNED BY THE AMBASSADOR'S LETTERS OF AUGUST 1963; THERE IS GREATER RISK OF MISUSE OF PROPERTY WHEN IT IS OWNED OUTRIGHT THAN WHEN IT IS RENTED; AND THERE IS NO NEED FOR THE ALLIES TO BE FORTHCOMING WHEN THE GDR REFUSES TO SELL AND EXTRACTS EXORBITANT RENTS IN EAST BERLIN. THERE IS PROBABLY SOME MISUNDERSTANDING IN REGARD TO WAREHOUSES AND JOINT VENTURES, INASMUCH AS THE FORMER SOVIET EMBASSY COUNSELLOR WAS INFORMED BY THE BRITISH POLAD SOME MONTHS AGO THAT THE ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS ANY TIME; WE WILL RENEW THIS OFFER AT THE POLAD LEVEL. AS FAR AS SOVIET WEST BERLIN PERSONNEL ARE CONCERNED, THERE HAVE BEEN ONE OR TWO INSTANCES WHERE APPROVAL HAS BEEN DELAYED ON SECURITY GROUNDS (THE BRITISH ARE STILL HOLDING UP APPROVAL IN ONE CURRENT, FLAGRANT CASE, AND WE HAVE URGED THEM TO EXPEDITE THEIR DECISION). BUT WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE DEPARTMENT WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO DEVISE PROCEDURES FOR ACCELERATING RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR CLEARANCE. SELIGMANN

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